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Chapter 14
Uruguay: A Mixed Reform
Rodolfo Saldain
Introduction
Toward the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth,
Uruguay was among the first countries in the hemisphere to introduce pen-
sions. However, during the latter half of the past century, social insurance
went through an extensive period of retrenchment as the maintenance of
generous social security benefits became incompatible with chronic eco-
nomic stagnation.
Although international organizations like the ILO urgently recom-
mended reform as early as 1964, it was not until 1979—during the mil-
itary dictatorship—that some parametric changes were introduced. By
then, the relatively generous benefits combined with an aging population
had resulted in the actuarial bankruptcy of the pension system. An insol-
vent social security system, covered by government transfers, represented
around 2 percent of GDP during the 1970s, equivalent to a little more than
20 percent of central government expenditures (see Table 14-1).
In the beginning, the strategies for confronting the crisis included raising
worker and employer contribution levels, which came to represent about
8 percent of GDP by the end of the 1970s. Funding was insufficient, how-
ever, and the purchasing power of pensions declined systematically. This
ended in 1989 with a constitutional reform that increased the budget for
pensions to approximately 15 percent of GDP.
In 1995 the third elected government after democracy was restored in
1985 approved a new structural reform. The new model is innovative in
that it maintained continuity with the Uruguayan statist tradition yet still
followed the regional trend toward privatization. The new system is mixed.
The main component, or first pillar, is pure PAYGO with respect to contri-
butions, benefits, and administration. The primacy of the first pillar will be
maintained even after the mixed system reaches maturity, around the year
2020.
The author would like to thank economist Bruno Golembiewsci for his assistance with the
tables, Larissa Bocanegra, who translated this document, and Stephen J. Kay and Tapen Sinha
for their editing and comments.
14-Kay-and-Sinha-c14 OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 360 of 378 August 20, 2007 17:40
360 Rodolfo Saldain
Table 14-1 Central Government Expenditures on Social Security (1,000s of
Nominal Pesos)
Year Central Government
Outlays on SS
Central Government
Total Indexed
Outlaysa
Weight of SS Expenditures
on Central Government
Nominal Outlay
Structure (%)
1974 103,594.35 438,426.11 23.63
1975 113,533.83 457,518.80 24.82
1976 115,718.16 505,420.05 22.90
1977 128,118.39 590,697.67 21.69
1978 157,635.47 667,816.09 23.60
1979 210,318.47 928,152.87 22.66
1980 506,923.08 1,439,252.75 35.22
1981 634,288.35 1,740,397.41 36.45
1982 870,237.24 1,977,217.83 44.01
1983 389,548.35 960,026.06 40.58
1984 298,485.12 901,067.55 33.13
1985 261,358.04 824,007.10 31.72
1986 276,970.14 965,530.85 28.69
1987 347,568.02 1,155,166.03 30.09
1988 396,553.07 1,254,071.50 31.62
1989 414,926.26 1,327,575.10 31.25
1990 378,246.02 1,322,066.52 28.61
1991 512,216.11 1,628,395.94 31.46
1992 709,677.27 1,987,605.18 35.71
1993 943,049.01 2,392,113.32 39.42
1994 1,238,793.63 2,934,836.78 42.21
1995 1,441,247.43 3,334,299.68 43.22
1996 1,712,481.27 3,681,136.15 46.52
1997 1,894,431.05 4,018,069.40 47.15
1998 1,972,784.57 4,132,022.44 47.74
1999 2,090,238.10 4,353,561.82 48.01
2000 2,056,682.64 4,269,617.13 48.17
2001 1,989,804.10 4,176,206.71 47.65
2002 1,439,320.12 3,169,018.31 45.42
2003 1,109,256.44 2,759,290.02 40.20
2004 1,154,658.82 2,992,841.55 38.58
Source: Author’s computations, based on projections from the Instituto Nacional de Estadis-
tica (National Statistics Institute).
a Does not include investment outlays.
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Although the pension system survived the largest financial crisis in the
country’s history in 2002, it faced a political challenge when the left Frente
Amplio coalition came to power in 2004. The Frente Amplio had system-
atically opposed the pension reform since its inception, and some sectors
of the coalition demanded the abolition of certain structural components,
such as the participation of administradora de fondos de ahorro provisional
(AFAPs, or private retirement saving fund administrators). Thus far, there
has apparently been no political attempt to alter the reform, as the govern-
ment has focused on developing a hospitable environment for foreign and
local investment.
Historical Evolution of the Pension System
In Uruguay’s coverage of old-age, survivorship, and disability risks (Sistema
de Invalidez, Vejez y Sobrevivencia, or IVS) started soon after independence
in 1829. In 1896 the first protection system based on the Bismarckian model
was created; it covered retirement for teachers, who were considered an
essential human resource in the creation of the new nation-state.
After a series of armed conflicts ended in 1904, Uruguay went through
an extensive period of democratic political stability—albeit with two limited
episodes of instability in 1933 and 1942—distinguished by a multiclass
and bipartisan political system.1 In this context, a vast network of social
security institutions developed that recognized workers’ rights. All workers
were gradually incorporated into this network. In 1943 rural workers were
incorporated, representing the last large and significant sector of the labor
force, and in 1954 coverage for old-age, survivorship, and disability was
extended to all primary wage-earning employment.
After the foundation and development periods of the Uruguayan social
security system, a long period of decline began in the mid-1940s, provoking
a crisis in the system. The state apparatus became an arena of political
conflict among the two traditional ‘catch-all political parties’, especially
with respect to the social security system. During this period, several special
pension systems were developed as a result of negotiations and bargaining
processes, and political clientelism in the social security institutions cover-
ing IVS risks became common practice.
The Crisis
These circumstances, along with inefficient investment policies of the ini-
tial reserves, tax evasion, poor administration, and a demography charac-
terized by low-birth rates and high life expectancy combined with economic
stagnation and slow growth, led to the financial and social crisis of the
system.
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In 1963 an ILO report stated that ‘it is no longer enough to apply
palliative remedies to improve the situation. Instead there should be a
radical change in the direction and implementation of social policy in
order to avoid the total social, administrative, and financial collapse of the
Uruguayan social security system’ (OIT 1964: 64–71).
For at least three decades, the predominant policy was to maintain the
formal–legal parameters of the social security system that promised access
to generous benefits, while in practice the value of those benefits fell due to
insufficient cost of living adjustments in an environment of high inflation.
The political leadership typically denied the problem in order to avoid
actions that would carry political or electoral costs. The government coped
with the financial disequilibria of the pension system by (a) cutting the
value of pensions in real terms,2 (b) not paying all legally owed benefits,
and (c) generating fiscal deficits in order to cover financial obligations.
During the military dictatorship that ruled from 1973 to 1984, there
was a clear concentration of power. Although an important parametric
reform in 1979 corrected some of the system’s main shortcomings, there
was no structural reform as in Chile. The regime that resulted from the
1979 reform (which endured through 1995) was pure PAYGO, with no
accumulation of reserves. It was centralized in the executive branch and
financed through worker, employer, and government contributions. The
results of this reform still resonate among the retired population, and the
worker/beneficiary ratio is likely to rise slightly through 2010, after which
the ratio is expected to deteriorate at a constant rate, according to all
projections.
The 1989 Constitutional Reform
In the early years following the return to democracy (1985–9), there were
strong demands for benefits, in particular for pension increases. During
that time, pensioner organizations emerged as a new social movement
(see Papadopulos 1992: 158–77). These groups formed alliances with other
political actors and demanded higher benefits, while at the same time
radically defending the public PAYGO system.
In 1989 pension organizations and their allies successfully sponsored a
plebiscite that amended Article 67 of the Constitution. Eighty percent of
the electorate supported the initiative, which is still in effect today.3 This
article determined that pensions would be adjusted according to the varia-
tion in the median salary index and would go into effect concurrently with
salary increases for employees of the central government. Fiscal balance
was maintained only because of insufficient adjustment in a context of high
inflation (which of course reduced the buying power of benefits). The new
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regulation altered one of the variables essential to the pension system’s
financial equilibrium: the ratio of the average benefit over the average
contribution base salary.4 In 1989 the average benefit was 58 percent of
the average contribution base salary; this figure jumped to 77.5 percent in
1991, the first full year of reform. That rapid jump meant that additional
resources equivalent to a 10-percent increase in the salary contribution rate
were necessary. Consequently, the annual Banco de Previsión Social del
Uruguay (BPS) pension budget rose from 7.7 percent of GDP in 1989 to
9.7 percent in 1991, and to more than 11 percent in 1994. (The BPS is
Uruguay’s Social Security Bank.)
There were only two administrative options to ease the excessive increase
in the pension budget: (a) reduce the value of the national minimum wage,
which was the measurement unit used to express pension ceilings and other
social security benefits, or (b) moderate salary increases, especially for state
workers, because of their direct impact on both the national budget and the
median wage index, on which pension increases were based. To generate
more income, the government declared a crackdown on evasion. Results
were positive, though limited by the fact that structural conditions for
evasion persisted.
Toward the 1995 Structural Reform
One virtue of the constitutional amendment of Article 67 was that it
brought national attention to the challenges of social security reform. It was
impossible to continue postponing difficult reform decisions by allowing
inflation to limit benefits. The magnitude of the problem demanded that
the government find the political will to implement difficult measures in
the face of powerful interest groups opposed to reform. Various proposals
were suggested based on foreseeable demographic trends and pension
system indicators. By all accounts, the system appeared to be moving rapidly
toward a financial crisis in the first decade of the next century.
After two failed attempts to introduce some parametric reforms in 1990,
the Lacalle administration summoned political leaders and representatives
of social sectors to discuss the magnitude of the problem, even though its
major impact would largely fall on future governments. The administration
proposed four objectives for the social security reform: (a) improve social
equity and individual fairness, (b) establish total financial transparency,
(c) achieve adequate financing of the programs administered by the BPS,
and (d) improve the adequacy of the financial structure. They added four
alternative proposals for analysis:
1. Maintain the current system, but modify the procedure used to calcu-
late the base reference salary and the replacement rates;5
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2. Create a new regime financed through individual capitalization. In
this case, it would be necessary to define ways to finance transition
costs6 and the legal nature of the new pension fund administrators;
3. Create a new pension system based on individual accounts but
financed via PAYGO;7and
4. Create a new two-tiered pension system that would include a state-
managed PAYGO system with benefits clearly lower than those of the
current regime,8 and a second tier based on individual capitalization,
with pension fund administrators operating in a competitive market.
In 1992 there was substantial progress toward reaching a political accord.
However, the left-wing Frente Amplio systematically opposed all social secu-
rity reform initiatives. Ultimately, the Chamber of Deputies did not approve
the project. That same year, the legislature (without the support of the left-
wing parties) agreed to modify the procedure to calculate pensions, but a
1994 plebiscite later reversed that modest reform and the Supreme Court
found it unconstitutional.9
The 1995 Reform
Negotiations over social security reform began in January 1995, after Julio
María Sanguinetti began his second term. An agreement soon resulted,
though it again did not have the support of the Frente Amplio.10 Political
agreement was hastened by the fact that the technical and political teams
working on the reform had worked together in prior years.
The Design of the 1995 Reform
The reform, centered on the idea of a mixed system, consisted of a tra-
ditional state-managed PAYGO pillar and a mandatory, private, individual
saving accounts pillar under private management, with old-age, disability,
and survivor’s insurance financed out of savings.11 In the new multipillar
system, workers contribute to each fund according to where their income
falls within a salary-level band. Additionally, the public sector participates
by providing a basic safety net pension (PAYGO system) to complement the
mandatory system of individual capitalization, administered by AFAPs and
insurance companies.12
Studies conducted in 1991 and 1992, which analyzed the financial fea-
sibility of the new mixed system, suggested the need to reduce the fiscal
impact of the transition. As a result, the reform was oriented toward (a) the
mandatory incorporation into the new mixed model of only the younger
population (younger than 40 years), and (b) a PAYGO component large
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enough not to affect benefits for workers still acquiring rights—that is,
those workers who had paid into the old system but had not yet qualified
for benefits.13 The ceiling proposed at the first level (PAYGO) was very
similar to the one in the old system, but with more stringent conditions
with respect to age and years of services. It was not necessary to acknowl-
edge previous contributions because older workers and those who had
contributed for a longer time could not be affiliated in the new system,
unless they wanted to contribute to a voluntary supplemental account. In
addition, the size of the first level—with relevant parametric changes—
covered practically the entire sum of benefits owed under the previous
regime, leaving unaffected the benefits that current workers were still
acquiring.14
According to Caristo and Forteza (2003), the 1995 reform and later
adjustments to the social security policy first increased and later decreased
the financing that the BPS required.15 In the first few years, the deficit
increased by more than half a point of GDP, mainly as a consequence of
decreasing the contributions withheld by the BPS. This situation changed
in later years, since financial obligations decreased as outlays decreased.
The improvement of the BPS financial results in the medium and long term
is mainly a result of decreasing payouts to people who had obtained benefits
without ever having contributed. According to the projections, from the
second decade of this century on, central government debt will be less than
if the reform had not taken place.
Multilateral credit organizations had a limited role in the conception
and design of the reform initiatives. Even at the World Bank there was
opposition to the proposed system at the beginning. On the other hand, at
the end of 1994, a consultant group from the Inter-American Development
Bank led by Francisco E. Barreto de Oliveira provided an important study
of policy alternatives, including an analysis of the feasibility of a mixed
system.
General Characteristics
The 1995 reform exclusively applies to BPS affiliates and provides for the
existence of three regimes: the previous, transition, and mixed:
 For those affiliates with acquired rights in the old regime as of Decem-
ber 31, 1996, the old system was maintained with no risk of having the
new regime applied to them, unless it would be more favorable;
 For affiliates aged 40 years or older by April 1, 1996, special transition
rules were established through a parametric reform of the PAYGO
system; and
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 For affiliates younger than 40 years by April 1, 1996, for those entering
the labor force for the first time, or for those (mentioned above) who
voluntarily opted for it, the mixed model applies. The option for the
mixed model is irreversible.
Regardless of the applicable regime, only work history registered after
April 1, 1996 would be recognized. The BPS keeps this history—which
includes time of service, remunerations, contributions, and other required
information—and updates it monthly. According to the institutional orga-
nization of the 1995 reform, the Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social
(MTSS, or Ministry of Labor and Social Security) is responsible for social
security policy. The BPS is in charge of the previous system, transition
system, and the first pillar of the mixed system. It is also responsible for
collections, including contributions to the second pillar destined for indi-
vidual accounts of the AFAPs’ affiliates. The Banco Central del Uruguay
(BCU, or Uruguayan Central Bank)—an autonomous organization with
public resources—supervises the new social security participants (AFAPs
and insurance companies) based on the creation of the mandatory indi-
vidual savings pillar. For special services provided to specific groups, there
are three parastatal pension funds (cajas),16 as well as military and police
pension funds.
The effective implementation of the reform was coordinated by the Plan-
ning and Budget Office through two ad hoc committees: the Evaluation
and Follow-Up Committee and the Social Security Reform Program.
The Transition Regime
The transition pension system—for those not already retired under the old
system or part of the new mixed system—includes a parametric reform. It
is a modified version of the old system, and its regulations are similar to
those of the first pillar in the mixed system. The new system (a) is based on
a PAYGO system; (b) gradually increases the retirement age for women by
5 years until it is equal to that of men (60 years); (c) increases by 5 years
the minimum number of years of service necessary to have pension rights
(to 35 years); (d) increases to 20 years the period used to calculate the
base reference salary;17 (e) reduces the replacement rate; ( f ) increases
by up to 120 percent the pension floor; and (g) progressively increases
the pension ceiling by about 60 percent. This system, exclusively PAYGO,
will apply to the great majority of new pensioners until about the year
2020.
The Mixed System
The first pillar includes, without exception, all affiliates in the mixed
system for the first UY$5,000 of monthly earnings in May 1995 values
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Table 14-2 General Regime
Remunerations Contributions
BPS AFAP
UY$12.525 US$521 Yes Optional
UY$12.525–$37.573 US$522–US$1,565 No Yes
UY$37.573 US$1,566 No Voluntary
(equivalent to about US$520 monthly in 2005). The second pillar includes
BPS affiliates for the band of salary UY$5,000 and UY$15,000 (equiva-
lent to about US$1,560 monthly in 2005 see Table 14-2). It also includes
affiliates with income lower than UY$5,000 who voluntarily opt to affiliate
with the second pillar, depositing half of their contribution to each pillar
(the decision is irrevocable).18 There is also a third pillar for voluntary
savings open to BPS affiliates for the band of salary over UY$15,000 per
month. (All values are expressed in pesos, adjusted automatically accord-
ing to the median salary index every time public salaries and pensions
increase.)
Financing is based on the following:
 Employee contribution of 15 percent of salary up to the pension ceil-
ing, with earnings up to UY$5,000 to the public pillar and earnings
between UY$5,000 and UY$15,000 to an individual account.19
 Employer contribution of 12.5 percent—or 14.5 percent for public
sector employers—up to UY$15,000 maximum earning deposited to
the BPS (PAYGO system, first pillar).
 Central government contribution, if needed to supplement the
finances of the BPS.
Current pensions and those to be paid in the future by the old rules,
transition, and first pillar of the mixed system are paid by BPS.
The second pillar of the mixed system entitles only authorized insurance
companies to issue life annuities. This component of the mixed system is
fully integrated with the first pillar, since to have access to these benefits it
is necessary to receive first pillar benefits. The only exception is for people
older than 65 years, who can collect their second pillar benefits without
contributing, while continuing their employment. If a worker dies without
naming a survivorship beneficiary, the personal account balance can be
inherited.
Benefits under the second pillar are the same as in the first pillar with
two different procedures:
 Defined contributions, or individual savings, covering the risk of old
age (ordinary retirement and extreme old age). In this case, the
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amount of the benefit is not legally defined, neither in absolute nor
relative terms. It is calculated based on individual savings account bal-
ances to the date funds are transferred from the AFAP to the insurance
company chosen by the affiliate, life expectancy according to general
official tables, and life annuities’ acquisition terms with the insurance
company.
 Defined benefit, or group insurance, for disability and death-at-work
coverage. In this case, the amount of the installment is legally defined
in relative terms: a determined percentage from a determined calcu-
lation base. For the disability pension and the transitory subsidy for
partial disability, benefits equal 45 percent of monthly base salary (on
which contributions to an AFAP savings account were based on the past
ten years of activity, or real time of contribution if less than ten years).
For survivorship pensions, the same pension allotment percentages
from the first pillar apply. This insurance is contracted by AFAPs with
an authorized insurance company.
The BPS is responsible for paying all benefits in the first pillar, while
insurance companies pay second pillar benefits, either those covered by
collective insurance or the life annuities to be contracted by affiliates.
Retirement Saving Fund Administrators
As is discussed above, the AFAPs—single-purpose corporations authorized
by the executive branch and the BCU—administer the private savings.20
Each AFAP administers only one retirement savings fund. AFAPs are reg-
ulated by the superintendency of the BCU. They compete for affiliates,
who can transfer their accounts from one administrator to other after
contributing for at least six months. The AFAPs invest available pension
fund savings and maintain updated individual savings accounts data. One
hundred percent of fund investment returns are credited to the affiliates’
accounts.21 The investment funds are regulated as an administration trust.
They are the property of the affiliates and are not part of the AFAPs’ assets
(and thus cannot be legally attached).
Collections are centralized under the BPS, which transfers affiliate con-
tributions to the AFAPs. This method of organizing the collection process
is considered one of the elements of cost rationalization, since it prevents
duplication of effort for administrators and employers. In 2005 the BPS
began to charge AFAPs for this service. AFAPs receive a commission for
their work as the only payment from their affiliates for their services.
Commissions are set freely according to the following rules:
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 All affiliates are charged the same commission, except for bonuses for
staying with an AFAP, as explained later;
 Commissions are charged only on mandatory contributions and volun-
tary deposits.
 Commission charges are not imposed on transfers from one AFAP to
another, nor are they charged on account returns;
 Commissions can be a fixed amount, a percentage of the worker con-
tribution, or a combination of these two; and
 AFAPs can provide bonuses for customer loyalty.
The law requires investment guidelines aimed at security, profitability,
diversification, and term compatibility criteria based on objectives and
investment limits found in the legislation (Table 14-3).
Implementation of the 1995 Reform
The 1995 reform implementation had to resolve several critical issues, some
derived from the peculiarities of its own design, others from its partial
introduction into the financial markets, and others due to its political and
social acceptance.
Design Challenges: Central Role of Public Institutions
From an operational perspective, there were two especially relevant char-
acteristics. The first—and most important—was the capacity of the BPS to
administer the new mixed system. The BPS had six months to undertake
a process in which it needed to account for the labor history of all active
workers, establish adequate processes for collecting revenue, and create a
process whereby contributions from affiliates in the mixed regime would be
distributed to AFAPs according to individual choices. Unlike most reforms
introduced in the region in the 1980s, which stressed the role of the private
sector, the 1995 Uruguayan reform gave to the BPS, the central public
pension administrative institution, the central role in the implementation
and administration of the reform.
The second characteristic was the creation of a publicly owned AFAP,
though it was fully governed by private law. This AFAP had to be fully
operational when the reform took effect and could not repeat the classic
inefficiencies of the public administration. From the start, workers flocked
to the publicly owned República AFAP, making it the market leader. This
leading role for a publicly owned AFAP has been one of the most notable
developments of the reform implementation process.
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Introduction into the Financial Markets
The new capitalized pillars now required a complete introduction into the
financial system. The system provided for a competitive market in which
AFAPs would compete for affiliates, as in other countries in the region.
When the reform took effect in April 1996, five AFAPs began operations;
shortly after, a sixth firm entered the market. Since that time, only mergers
have taken place; with severe barriers to entry in a small market with
low new enrollment and few transfers, no other firms have entered the
market. Today, there are four AFAPs: República, Afinidad, Unión-Capital,
and Integración (see Table 14-4).
By June 2005, AFAPs administered US$1.678 billion, equal to 11.7 per-
cent of GDP (see Table 14-5). República AFAP, which is owned by 3 state-
owned firms, managed 56.5 percent of these funds, a share that was rela-
tively constant during the 10 years after the reform. Fifty-three percent of
the assets were in Uruguayan pesos and 47 percent in US dollars, while
81 percent of assets were invested in Uruguayan public debt titles. Since
the system came into effect, the profitability of the funds in US dollars
has been 9.59 percent annually and 12 percent in indexed Uruguayan
pesos. Returns vary little among AFAPs due to legal regulations that led
to the homogenization of investment policies and the lack of appropriate
investment instruments, which in turn has contributed to a concentration
of investment in instruments issued by the public sector.
For the 10 years after the reform, the 672,080 AFAP affiliates (as of June
2005) were distributed among the 4 AFAPs in a relatively stable pattern.
República AFAP consolidated its lead, with slightly more than 37 percent
of the affiliates. In looking at affiliate salary levels, República AFAP has
been the leader among affiliates with higher salary levels. During the first
four years of the reform, the AFAPs competed intensely to encourage
affiliates to transfer to their firms. Firms employed large sales forces at
very high costs and ended with essentially null results, as market shares
remained stable. Toward the end of 2000, the six operating AFAPs agreed
to end this strategy. Transfers came to a halt, making it clear that affiliation
or transfer decisions are not sensitive to product differences. For exam-
ple, there are differences in commission fees, but they do not seem to
have an impact on an individual’s decision to change or stay in the same
AFAP.
AFAPs charge an administration commission, which since the beginning
of the system has averaged from 1.58 to 2.25 percent of a worker’s salary.22
Since 1996, the group insurance for death and disability, which AFAPs con-
tract for their affiliates, has ranged from a minimum value of 0.553 percent
in 1998 to a maximum value of 1.165 percent in 2003. Charges from the
second pillar of the mixed system do not have a regulated fixed ceiling. In
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a small market such as Uruguay’s—with only four participants—it is reason-
able to think that price agreements or other anticompetitive practices are
likely to occur.
Given the recent implementation of the system, benefits to be paid from
the second pillar are still rare. Through June 2005, there were 4,002 cases,
mainly survivorship pensions.
In 2002, six years after the reform, the second pillar successfully faced
the deepest financial crisis in the history of the country. The crisis, which
had two phases, could have severely damaged the reform. The first phase
was based on criminal actions involving the management of two banks that
owned AFAPs—100 percent of an AFAP in one case. The second was the
result of the bank run that led to the closure of three of the largest banks,
the public banks’ failure to meet depositors’ demands for withdrawals,
and the fiscal crisis that forced a restructuring of long-term public debt
as an alternative to default. The institutional structure of the second pillar
meant that the criminal actions of the two private banks owning AFAPs
had no impact whatsoever on pension funds. At the same time, the Batlle
administration’s solution to the 2002 fiscal crisis, which had the strong
support of the US government and multilateral credit agencies, prevented
damage to pension fund assets that were largely invested in Uruguayan
public debt.
Political Opposition
From a political perspective, the reform had to overcome the strong opposi-
tion generated by the unions, pensioner organizations, and, especially, the
Frente Amplio. These social and political organizations developed a cam-
paign against the reform, but opponents fell just short in their campaign
to collect enough signatures to turn the issue into a popular referendum.
Possible Future Trends
In March 2005 the leftist candidate, Tabaré Vázquez, assumed the presi-
dency, and the Frente Amplio coalition won a legislative majority in both
houses. This party has been highly critical of the 1995 reform. With a wide
legislative majority, President Vázquez’s administration could redirect pol-
icy. Questioning the social security reform was part of its political strategy, as
it focused on restoring the classic characteristics of the Uruguayan welfare
state, which has a strong hold on the Uruguayan collective imagination.
During its ten years of opposition to the 1995 reform, the left did not
provide an alternative project. During the 2004 electoral campaign some
sectors of the leftist coalition—including their own candidate and the
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current president of the Republic—admitted that they would not abrogate
the 1995 reform but would instead introduce some adjustments. This posi-
tion was rejected by some members of the coalition, who continue to call
for the reform’s demise.
In its first two years in office, the Vázquez administration focused on
improving the business climate. Maintaining the basic characteristics of the
1995 reform is an important step toward reaching that goal. Introducing
adjustments to its design to improve the reform’s efficiency is perfectly
compatible with this goal. Among the options it could consider are (a)
allowing for the administration of more than one investment fund, with
different degrees of risk; (b) redefining voluntary savings regulations; (c)
modifying insurance companies’ regulations regarding life annuity calcu-
lations, including separating technical reserves into trusts separate from
other insured risks; and (d) making the BCU superintendency of pension
funds autonomous to avoid potential interference from other BCU sectors
that have competing policy interests.
At the same time, AFAPs could be permitted to invest between 10 and
15 percent of funds outside the country. This measure, which is strongly
supported by the AFAPs, has encountered stiff political opposition and does
not currently seem viable.
A new administration considering socially oriented reforms could take
two actions: make access to old-age pensions more flexible by allowing
retirement after less than 35 years of service—for example, at age 65
years—and re-examine the income-tested noncontributory pension pro-
gram, also administered by the BPS, and adapt it to the new context of
contributive benefits, in which it will no longer be possible to easily obtain
a pension without having contributed. With this perspective, it is necessary
to guard against two risks: first, the temptation to direct the funds toward
social spending at the expense of profitability and security and, second, to
favor a greater market concentration, which would benefit República AFAP.
Indeed, if the new administration gives in to forces favoring the rollback
of the 1995 reform, the most powerful tool to carry that out would be
to promote market concentration, which would work to the detriment of
the private administrators. Because it is better able than its competitors
to reduce commissions, República AFAP could withstand this change. If
competition among administrators disappears because of market rules, the
model would lose part of its mixed character. Pension fund administration
would be concentrated in the hands of public agencies, which would prob-
ably increase the political and financial risks inherent to the system.
If the political and legislative will were there, the relative weights of
PAYGO versus savings components could be modified, giving PAYGO
greater weight. In the short and medium term, this alternative could have a
positive fiscal impact because BPS collections would immediately increase.
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The design of the 1995 reform is flexible enough to adapt to changes in the
relative weights of its two pillars, to either adjust exposure to different risks
or to incorporate changes in the way the national community perceives the
role of individuals, society, and the state. However, in the long term, with
the current parameters of the PAYGO component, fiscal obligations would
increase.
The risk of market concentration exists independently of an express pol-
icy in this regard. To avoid such concentration, it is necessary to decrease
barriers to entry for new competitors. In fact, if the role of fiduciary
administration is maintained (to ensure the inviolability of social security
funds), the single-purpose requirement for administrators could be ended,
thereby opening up competition to firms in related industries, always under
an independent superintendency. Certainly, a measure of this kind would
also reduce administrative costs considerably.
If an increase in population coverage is sought, it should not be oriented
toward the second pillar but rather toward the first, since this is where
mandatory coverage is accessed. The main limitations to be surpassed are
exogenous to the pension system in that they are based on the labor market
structure. Nevertheless, some endogenous actions—which are not exempt
from fiscal impact—could influence the achievement of this objective.
These include revising eligibility conditions of noncontributive pensions
for the aged and reducing formal labor contracting costs, within the con-
text of a tax reform.
The future of the 1995 reform depends especially on the balance
between trends inside President Vázquez’s own administration, which has
expressed concern over preserving the investment and business climate.
This goal, along with the lack of a viable alternative to the 1995 reform,
suggests that the policy path with respect to pensions will be maintained,
without precluding the introduction of advisable and necessary adjust-
ments. In the coming years, social security will continue to be prominent
on the national agenda, but without the urgency and dramatic tone of
years past. This will foster improvement of the mixed system, which has
already been consolidated. There is no doubt that a healthy, balanced social
security system, which adequately integrates social solidarity and individual
fairness, will continue to be one of the main instruments for the personal
well-being and social development of Uruguay.
Notes
1 According to Hobsbawn (1995: 188), ‘the list of solid constitutional states in the
Western Hemisphere was small: Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, and the United
States and now the forgotten “South American Switzerland” with its only real
democracy, Uruguay’ (translated from Spanish).
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2 The real pension re-evaluation index, July 1962 = 100, was 34.29 in December
1973, reaching its lowest value in December 1985: 20.34. This index results from
comparing pension increases with the Consumer Price Index.
3 Only presidential candidate Jorge Batlle and the far-left Tupamaros National
Liberation Movement opposed the initiative, for different reasons. In a second show
of force, these organizations gathered enough signatures for another plebiscite
initiative for constitutional amendment, this time to block the parametric reforms
approved by the parliament in 1992. A new plebiscite was held during the national
elections in 1994, and an ample majority approved the initiative, which declared
unconstitutional the reforms previously introduced as part of the budgetary
laws.
4 After the amendment took effect and as a result of applying the constitutional
reform, the real pension revaluation index went from 24.90 in December 1989 up
to its highest value in 1999—41.64. Since then, that index has declined in line with
the average salary decline.
5 This parametric reform alternative was approved by the parliament in 1992. The
Supreme Court later found it to be unconstitutional, based on the results of the
November 1994 plebiscite.
6 The team appointed by the Lacalle administration analyzed the financial feasibil-
ity of adopting a Chilean-style individual capitalization system and concluded that
the transition costs would be prohibitive.
7 This notional defined contribution alternative was the one developed for the
project that the executive branch sent to the parliament in 1991. The project was
given priority status but not approved.
8 This was the selected alternative for the reform finally approved in 1995.
9 It was sponsored by the Frente Amplio, the union and pensioner organizations,
and also—strangely—by the political sector of ex-President Sanguinetti, who had
originally approved the law.
10 This coalition of political parties formed the main opposition force to those
governments that approved and implemented the 1995 reform. It assumed the
presidency in March 2005 with the support of more than 50% of the population
and with an outright legislative majority.
11 The design did not have the support of international credit organizations, and
even the World Bank opposed it initially. However, after the operation began, the
World Bank participated in the reform implementation process.
12 The shares of one of the AFAPs are owned by three public institutions.
13 Otherwise, social security benefit obligations accrued in the old system about
to be repealed would have to be acknowledged (known as ‘recognition bonds’ in
Chilean law).
14 This total, based on the minimum wage and administered price levels, had
already lost value in order to limit the system’s financial obligations after the 1989
constitutional reform.
15 Using a different methodology, Noya and Laens (2000) affirm that, in the long
run, reductions of more than 2.1% of GDP are obtained in all cases. The reduc-
tions result from reducing social security expenditures in the PAYGO first pillar by
5.7% of GDP. The reductions are counteracted in part by diverting contributions
equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP toward the capitalization pillar. In contrast, in the
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short and medium term, the primary deficit increases, oscillating between 1.6 and
1.8% of GDP, the result of reducing PAYGO contributions as well as the expansion
on social security expenditures introduced by the same reform.
16 Caja Bancaria de Jubilaciones y Pensiones (Bank Employee Pension Fund), Caja
Jubilaciones y Pensiones de Profesionales Universitarios (University Professional
Pension Fund), and Caja Notarial de Seguridad Social (Notary Pension Fund).
17 The previous system-based pensions on a reference salary covering the past three
years in the labor force.
18 These workers earning less than UY$5,000 retain the right to 75% of the benefit
that they would have received in the public PAYGO pillar (even though half of their
contributions go to an individual account).
19 The contribution ceiling does not apply to those in the previous and transition
systems.
20 Policymakers stipulated that one AFAP was to be property of the BPS, by itself or
jointly with the state-owned Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay (BROU),
Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay (BHU), and Banco de Seguros del Estado (BSE).
República AFAP, the administrator with the largest number of affiliates and the
highest total of administered funds, is owned by the BROU, BPS, and BSE.
21 There is a minimum return requirement that if not met will eventually result in
the liquidation of the AFAP.
22 Today, República AFAP charges the lowest administration fees (fixed and variable
commissions).
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